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ABSTRACT 
Monopoly Pricing with Negative Network Effects: the Case of Vaccines 
by Sebastian Kessing and Robert Nuscheler * 
We study the market for vaccinations considering income heterogeneity on the 
demand side and monopoly power on the supply side. A monopolist has an 
incentive to exploit the external effect of vaccinations and leave the poor 
susceptible in order to increase the willingness to pay of the rich. Even the 
possibility to perfectly price discriminate does not remove this incentive. 
Pigouvian subsidies may even make things worse. Mandatory vaccination 
programs covering only the poor succeed in eradicating the disease. This offers 
an efficiency based rationale for distribution-oriented national or international 
public health interventions. 
 
Keywords: Vaccination, monopoly pricing, price discrimination, negative network 
 effects, Pigouvian subsidies, mandatory vaccination programs 
JEL Classification: D42, D62, H23, I11, I18 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Monopolpreisbildung mit negativen Netzwerkeffekten am Beispiel von 
Impfstoffen 
Wir untersuchen den Markt für Impfstoffe, wobei wir Einkommensungleichheit 
auf der Nachfrageseite und Monopolmacht auf der Angebotsseite unterstellen. 
Ein Monopolist hat den Anreiz, den externen Effekt von Impfungen aus-
zunutzen. So wird er die Armen strategisch ungeimpft lassen, um die Zahlungs-
bereitschaft der Reichen zu erhöhen. Selbst für den Fall der perfekten Preis-
diskriminierung bleibt dieser Anreiz bestehen. Pigou Subventionen können das 
Marktergebnis noch verschlechtern. Staatliche Impfprogramme, die nur die 
Armen abdecken, können die Krankheit auslöschen. Dies liefert eine effizienz-
basierte Begründung für verteilungsorientierte nationale wie internationale Inter-
ventionen in den Impfmarkt. 
                                                 
*  We thank Kai A. Konrad, Helmut Bester, Johannes Münster, the participants of the 
Microeconomic Colloquium at the Freie Universität Berlin, and the participants of the CEPR 
workshop on health economics and public policy in Bergen for helpful comments. The usual 
caveat applies.  
 
 
1 Introduction
Traditionally, vaccinations were regarded as one of the prime examples of positive exter-
nalities. Consequently, government intervention in the form of mandatory vaccinations
and Pigouvian subsidies were considered to be appropriate policy responses to the distor-
tions caused by the externality. More recently, this traditional view has been challenged
by various contributions that produced a number of somewhat conﬂicting results about
the form and optimality of government intervention in the market for vaccines (see e.g.
Brito et al. (1991), Francis (1997), and Geoﬀard and Philipson (1997)). These results typ-
ically depend on the speciﬁc assumptions made in the models about agent heterogeneity,
market structure and dynamics. This paper contributes to this literature by consider-
ing strategic incentives and optimal government responses in the context of two hitherto
neglected dimensions. First, individuals are assumed to diﬀer with respect to income.
Second, monopoly power on the supply side is considered.
In the existing theoretical literature agent heterogeneity is usually introduced, if at all,
through the assumption that the disutility of vaccinations, i.e. side eﬀects, varies. Em-
pirically, disutility is diﬃcult to observe. As empirical studies of individual vaccination
decisions usually ﬁnd a clear positive relationship between income and the probability of
being vaccinated, introducing agent heterogeneity into the theoretical analysis through
income diﬀerences would seem to be a natural step. Philipson (1996, table 2, p. 624), for
example, ﬁnds a positive income eﬀect on the probability of measles vaccination for chil-
dren in the U.S. England et al. (2001, p. 19) report that, if there is a fee, as with hepatitis
B in China, “poorer people are more likely to go without essential immunization”. More-
over, since government action usually aﬀects people’s incomes, such an analysis promises
to be a better approximation of the consequences of diﬀerent policy measures.
The second key element in our treatment is its focus on monopoly power on the
supply side. This assumption is motivated by recent developments in the vaccine industry.
Important changes in U.S. legislation in 1986, which eﬀectively shield manufacturers from
the liability risk of new vaccines, resulted in a substantial increase in R&D eﬀorts and
these have recently lead to a dramatic increase in the availability of a number of new
1
vaccines (BusinessWeek Online (2002)). Russell (2002) points out that two developments
have also increased monopoly power signiﬁcantly. First, there has been a shift from
commodity vaccines to vaccines which are heavily protected by intellectual property rights.
The new Hepatitis B vaccine introduced in the late 1980s has for example about thirty
associated patents. Similarly, Reiss and Strauss (1998) document that between 1980 and
1995 patent applications for vaccines at the European patent oﬃce rose by a factor of
seven and that this development has been fuelled by the progress made in the ﬁeld of
genetically engineered vaccines in particular.1 Second, the ongoing concentration in the
industry at all levels, from research and development to marketing organizations, has
left only a few key players. Furthermore, as ﬁrms are increasingly specializing in speciﬁc
diseases and their core ﬁelds of expertise, competitive pressure is being further attenuated.
A vaccine monopolist has two main incentives: (i) to keep the disease alive and (ii)
to increase the prevalence of the disease in order to increase the willingness to pay for
vaccination.2 In their dynamic model Geoﬀard and Philipson (1997) address the ﬁrst
incentive, but remain silent about the second incentive. We provide the missing part
of the analysis using a static model. On the demand side, we consider the case where
the population has to pay for the vaccinations, i.e. the costs are not covered by health
insurance companies or the state. Consequently, there is no bargaining either between
insurance companies or state agencies.3
We summarize both the income dependence of the individual willingness to pay and
the external eﬀect of a reduced infection probability due to a higher number of vaccinated
individuals using a simple linear aggregate demand schedule faced by the monopolist.
1“The four industry leaders (Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Aventis Pasteur, and Wyeth) are estimated to
spend more than US$750 million a year on vaccine R&D—as much as a ﬁvefold jump at some companies
since 1992.” (BusinessWeek Online (2002))
2Although not in a monopoly context, the case of measles oﬀers some insights: more than 99 percent of
the disease burden of measles fall on low and middle income countries, with more than 750,000 deaths in
the year 2000. Full immunization could save roughly 28 million disability adjusted life years (see Kremer
(2002, pp. 70-71)).
3For an empirical analysis that tests whether price discrimination or bargaining is present in the U.S.
vaccine market see Kauf (1999).
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The linearity assumption allows explicit results to be obtained, but none of the results
depend on it qualitatively. The decisive element in this setting is the monopolist’s second
strategic incentive mentioned above. This is most easily analyzed in a static environment.
But the results will also apply in a dynamic framework, since the importance of the
external eﬀect increases.4 Although the emphasis of the analysis is on the case without
price discrimination we also consider perfect price discrimination. All qualitative results,
including the comparative statics, are robust. With price discrimination, vaccination
discrimination is in fact reduced. But, in contrast to the standard model without external
eﬀects, the outcome may still be ineﬃcient. The ﬁndings of the robustness of the strategic
incentives are relevant for policy recommendations since multi-tier pricing is pervasive in
real world vaccine markets (Russell (2002)).5
In the theory of public goods, the problem of under-provision can be eliminated by
Pigouvian subsidies. However, although vaccinations are an example of privately provided
public goods, subsidies do not work very well. At ﬁrst demand increases as the individual
price is reduced. However, this increase lowers the infection probability and thus reduces
the willingness to pay. This counteracting eﬀect limits the eﬀect of these subsidies (see
Geoﬀard and Philipson (1997, p. 225)). We show that subsidies may make things even
worse. We assume that the price subsidy is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation creating
a negative income eﬀect. If this eﬀect is suﬃciently large, the positive price eﬀect is
overcompensated and a smaller proportion of people are vaccinated. This contrasts with
the classical regulation arguments for Pigouvian subsidies and strengthens Philipson’s
(2000) argument, that “Pigouvian subsidies traditionally seen as resolving the under-
provision problem of vaccines can be short-run, or out of steady state, arguments” (p.
1777), since these may even fail in static settings. Recently, Philipson and Mechoulan
(2003) have argued that subsidies are likely to distort R&D incentives.
4Francis (1997) showed that in his dynamic setting the externality disappears. The allocation is
eﬃcient. But with heterogenous individuals this result does not generally hold.
5The UN Accelerating Access Initiative supports diﬀerential pricing for AIDS drugs (see
http://www.unaids.org/acc access/). In this context Roche was more or less forced to increase the dis-
count on their AIDS drugs for developing countries to roughly 90 percent of the Swiss price (see Me´decins
Sans Frontie`res (2003)).
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Another public policy usually suggested is mandatory vaccination. If mandatory vac-
cination programs do not cover the whole population, the people vaccinated lower the
probability that the susceptible will be infected. The willingness to pay is reduced, i.e.,
mandatory demand crowds out voluntary demand. This is a standard argument for why
it is diﬃcult to eradicate a disease by mandatory vaccination if not the entire population
is included in the program (see Philipson (2000, p. 1781)). However, such a program
is much more eﬀective with income-dependant demand: as people’s incomes diﬀer, the
public program can cover the poor and the monopolist the rich. Of course the willingness
to pay of the rich is reduced, but it remains relatively high due to the income eﬀect. Full
vaccination can be achieved with a mandatory participation rate that is strictly smaller
than one. Thus, our analysis provides an eﬃciency argument for public health vaccina-
tion programs that focus on the poor like those typically supported by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Worldbank.
The approach presented here is related to Brito et al. (1991). They consider a static
model with a continuum of individuals whose disutility from vaccination diﬀers. Since
vaccines are provided free of charge, price discrimination cannot be studied in their setting.
The ﬁrst-best outcome can be implemented by subsidizing those who decide to vaccinate,
or by taxing those without immunization. But when the subsidy has to be ﬁnanced
through taxation, the ﬁrst-best can only be attained under the strong assumption of
identical marginal utility of income across individuals. In their dynamic model, Geoﬀard
and Philipson (1997) address the question of disease eradication. Both price subsidies
and mandatory vaccination programs have limited impact, since the positive eﬀects of
the respective policies are partly oﬀset by the negative eﬀect of the externality.
The current paper is also related to the literature on network externalities, e.g. Bensaid
and Lesne (1996), Cabral et al. (1999), and Mason (2000). The main diﬀerence is the
sign of the network eﬀect. This is positive in these models but negative in ours, leading
to completely diﬀerent results. With a positive network eﬀect, introductory pricing may
occur to built up a certain critical network size. With vaccinations it is the other way
round: in order to prevent the market shrinking or disappearing a critical mass will never
be exceeded.
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The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we present the main ingredients of our
model. The monopolist’s price setting problem and the comparative static properties of
this solution are studied in section 3. Perfect price discrimination is analyzed in section
4. In section 5 we discuss public policies that may be used to reduce discrimination and
thus increase social welfare. Section 6 concludes. The appendix provides a generalization
of the reduced form applied throughout the paper.
2 The model
Consider a population of mass one with individuals who diﬀer in income but are otherwise
homogenous. Income is denoted a and is continuously distributed on the interval [aL, aH ],
where 0 < aL ≤ aH . An individual’s willingness to pay for vaccination depends on her
income a and the expected share of individuals who get vaccination, θe ∈ [0, 1]:
(1) p = p(θe, a).
The higher the expected rate of immunization θe, the lower the expected share of sus-
ceptible individuals 1 − θe. A high θe is associated with a low expected risk of infection
πe, ∂πe/∂θe < 0. Clearly, the willingness to pay for vaccination increases in the risk of
infection. We thus postulate ∂p/∂θe < 0, which captures the external eﬀect of vaccina-
tions. Furthermore, in line with the empirical evidence, it is assumed that the willingness
to pay increases in income ∂p/∂a > 0. While the external eﬀect of vaccinations is a
general feature of the market, a positive income eﬀect is not so obvious. In the appendix,
interpreting vaccination as an insurance decision, we derive a suﬃcient condition on pref-
erences for yielding a positive income eﬀect. Finally, we assume p(1, a) > 0, implying the
existence of an exogeneous infection risk. While made for simplicity, this can be justiﬁed
by infection threats from other countries6, accidental laboratory outbreaks, or terrorist
attacks7.
6The way infectious diseases can spread around the world can be seen currently with the Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) that originated in China.
7Although smallpox is said to be eradicated, there is a positive willingness to pay for vaccines.
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To simplify the analysis, and in order to derive explicit closed form solutions, we
summarize the individual willingness to pay by the following simple linear scheme
(2) p(θe, a) = zθ(1− θe) + zaa,
where za ∈ (0, 1) measures the income eﬀect and zθ > 0 the importance of the external
eﬀect. The upper bound on za is justiﬁed by normality, while the lower bound reﬂects our
central assumption of a positive income eﬀect. Furthermore we assume that the population
is uniformly distributed on the interval [aL, aH ]. None of these assumptions is necessary
for the results we derive below. However, their use signiﬁcantly eases the presentation of
the main ideas. As will become clear, a downward sloping aggregate demand function is
suﬃcient for most results. We discuss the conditions under which demand is downward
sloping in the appendix.
There is a monopolist who provides a vaccine that yields perfect protection against
the disease and that has no side eﬀects. His price setting problem is analyzed in a two
stage game. At stage 1 the monopolist sets the price pm. We analyze two versions of the
game, in section 3 we study standard monopoly pricing. Here pm is constant and denotes
the price at which the monopolist is willing to sell to all consumers actually demanding
vaccination. In section 4 the case of perfect price discrimination is addressed. The price
may depend on income so that pm = pm(a) is a price schedule. At stage 2 individuals
observe prices, form expectations about the vaccination rate, and thus about the infection
probability, and decide whether to vaccinate or not, i.e. aggregate demand is realized.
Solving the game backwards leads to a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Deriving
aggregate demand requires ﬁrst analyzing the role of consumers’ expectations for vacci-
nation decisions. As the analyses diﬀer for the two cases studied they are relegated to
the respective sections of the paper (see lemma 1 and lemma 3 below). Once aggregate
demand is derived, determining the monopolist’s optimal policy is straightforward.
3 Monopoly pricing
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of standard monopoly pricing where the monopolist only
quotes a single price. In order to derive the stage two vaccination equilibrium we assume
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symmetric expectations and require expectations to be consistent, i.e. expectations must
be fulﬁlled in equilibrium. The second useful property is the sorting of individuals by
income. In particular, for a given expected infection risk, an individual who decides to be
vaccinated knows that everybody richer than herself will also be vaccinated.
Before we solve for the equilibrium of the vaccination subgame, we deﬁne the critical
consumer θ. Let pm > 0 be some ﬁxed price for the vaccine, then θ = θ (pm) solves
(3) pm = p
(
θ, a
(
θ
))
= zθ
(
1− θ)+ za (aH − θ∆) ,
where ∆ := aH − aL. The income of the critical consumer is a := a
(
θ
)
= aH − θ∆.
Since the willingness to pay p
(
θ, a
(
θ
))
strictly decreases in θ, the critical consumer is
well-deﬁned, i.e. θ is unique.
In lemma 1 we show that there are unique expectations for every given price pm. How
consistency of expectations can be used to derive the aggregate demand is demonstrated
in lemma 2.
Lemma 1 Individuals facing a price pm will rationally expect θ (pm) to be the immuniza-
tion rate.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. So, suppose that individuals expect the
immunization rate θe > θ. Then, the willingness to pay for vaccination of type θ is
p
(
θe, a
(
θ
))
= zθ (1− θe)+ za
(
aH − θ∆
)
< pm. Individual θ will not demand vaccination
and neither will all consumers with lower income than aH − θ∆. Thus immunization
with expectations θe > θ will actually be lower than θ so that expectations can never be
conﬁrmed. A similar reasoning applies to all θe < θ proving inconsistency of all θe = θ.
The lemma implies that we can concentrate on cases where the two arguments of the
willingness to pay function are identical. To ease notation we will thus write p (θ) :=
p (θ, a (θ)). Notice that we also omit the bar.
Lemma 2 The aggregate demand function the monopolist is facing at the ﬁrst stage of
the game is given by
(4) θ (pm) =
zθ + zaaH − pm
zθ + za∆
.
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Proof. Since the vaccination equilibrium at price pm is fully characterized by θ (pm),
deriving aggregate demand simply requires solving equation (3) for θ.
Given these lemmata, the game boils down to a game of complete information. By set-
ting the price, the monopolist can directly inﬂuence expectations about the immunization
rate and thus exploit the external eﬀect associated with vaccinations. Alternatively the
monopolist’s policy may be derived by optimization with respect to p or θ. For notational
convenience we stick to the latter yielding the following objective function
(5) Π(θ) = p(θ)θ = (zθ(1− θ) + za(aH − θ∆))θ.
We consider constant marginal costs of zero, implying disease eradication, i.e. θ = 1, as
being socially optimal. The ﬁrst order condition is derived by diﬀerentiation yielding8
(6) θ∗ =
zθ + zaaH
2(zθ + za∆)
.
Without the externality, the monopolist would face the inverse demand schedule p (θ) =
zθ + za(aH + θ∆) yielding an optimal supply of
zθ+zaaH
2za∆
> θ∗. With the externality, the
monopolist has an incentive to reduce supply in order to increase the willingness to pay
and thus proﬁt. The externality reduces the elasticity of demand and thereby ampliﬁes
monopoly power. This interpretation demonstrates that this result is very general. It
holds as long as aggregate demand is downward sloping.9 The price corresponding to θ∗
is
(7) p∗m =
zθ
2
+ zaaH .
The price increases in all exogenous parameters except aL. The comparative static
properties of θ∗ are much more informative. First, note that ∂θ∗/∂za > 0. With an
increasing income eﬀect, the relative importance of the external eﬀect of vaccinations is
reduced and with it the incentive to cut the supply. More interesting is the eﬀect of a
change in the external eﬀect parameter zθ which is clearly negative, i.e. ∂θ
∗/∂zθ < 0. The
higher the external eﬀect of susceptible individuals on the willingness to pay, the higher
8To avoid θ∗ exceeding one, it is assumed that zθ + za (∆− aL) ≥ 0.
9See the appendix for a condition for preferences that yield a downward sloping demand.
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the monopolists’ incentive to exploit this eﬀect, i.e. to reduce the amount of vaccines
sold.
To study the eﬀect of income inequality on equilibrium let aH = a + ∆/2 and
aL = a − ∆/2. Then θ∗ = zθ+za(a+∆/2)2(zθ+za∆) . The income inequality eﬀect is observed by
diﬀerentiation with respect to ∆ yielding ∂θ∗/∂∆ < 0. The more unequally the income is
distributed among the population, the more severe the problem of vaccination discrimina-
tion. Note that the average income a is not aﬀected by changes in ∆. Now consider that
the population as a whole becomes richer, but (absolute) inequality remains unchanged:
∂θ∗/∂a > 0. The income eﬀect becomes more important relative to the discrimination
eﬀect. Consequently, a higher share of the population decides to vaccinate. To summa-
rize, vaccination discrimination is more likely to occur in societies that are poor or face
substantial income inequality.
4 Perfect price discrimination
In this section we consider the case where the monopolist can observe individual income.
Without externality, this induces eﬃciency and enables him to obtain the entire rent.
Although this represents a benchmark case, it nevertheless deserves particular attention
because multi-tier pricing is pervasive in vaccine markets (Russell (2002)). This observa-
tion holds for national markets but even more so at the international level, where devel-
oping countries receive vaccines at signiﬁcantly lower prices than developed countries. Of
course, the mechanisms of our model are also valid in such an international context, if an
international link exists between the infection probabilities.10
Again, there is a two stage game. Analyzing the impact of expectations on demand
is little more involved with perfect price discrimination because demand has to be de-
termined for every possible price schedule that may be oﬀered. The following lemma
demonstrates that there is a unique expectation for every relevant price schedule.
10The recent outbreak of SARS in China and its spread to Europe and, in particular, North America
dramatically demonstrates the correlation between infection risks.
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Lemma 3 The monopolist oﬀers a price schedule of the following type:
(8) pm
(
θ; θ
)
=

 zθ
(
1− θ)+ za (aH − θ∆) for θ ≤ θ
∞ for θ > θ
.
Given this schedule, individuals rationally expect θ to be the immunization rate.
Proof. Before addressing expectations we have to show that it is suﬃcient to analyze
price schedules like those mentioned above. First, note that the schedule will have a
cut-oﬀ value of income a ∈ [aL, aH ] such that all individuals with incomes higher than a
will demand vaccination and those with lower incomes will not. If this were not the case,
the monopolist would beneﬁt from reallocating vaccinations. At a the monopolist will
demand the entire willingness to pay p (θe, a). For incomes exceeding a he simply adds
the income eﬀect za (a− a) and again obtains the entire rent. Individuals whose incomes
fall short of a receive no oﬀer. Using the relationship a = aH − θ∆, the relevant price
schedules may be written as in equation (8).
Given this schedule, the (symmetric) expectation θe can never exceed θ but may be
lower. So, consider that θe < θ. Then the willingness to pay of type θ is p (θe, θ) =
zθ (1− θe) + za (aH − θ∆) > zθ
(
1− θ) + za (aH − θ∆) = pm (θ; θ). Since this holds for
all θ ≤ θ, all individuals with income higher than aH − θ∆ will vaccinate contradicting
θe < θ. Thus, θe = θ results.
By oﬀering a price schedule as shown in equation (8), the monopolist sets not only
prices but also the quantity oﬀered in the market. As θ is unique, optimization over θ
completes the analysis. The objective function is given by
(9) Π(θ) = zθ(1− θ)θ + za
∫ θ
0
(aH − θ∆)dθ.
Optimization with respect to θ yields
(10) θppd =
zθ + zaaH
2zθ + za∆
.
Qualitatively, the comparative static properties of θppd compare with those of θ∗. Com-
paring equations (6) and (10) unambiguously reveals θppd > θ∗. The monopolist’s ability
to demand prices that are conditional on the willingness to pay reduces the prevalence of
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the disease. This is well in line with standard monopoly theory. However, the following
proposition contrasts with it, highlighting the peculiarity of the vaccine market, namely,
the external eﬀect.
Proposition 1 For a suﬃciently strong external eﬀect, zθ > zaaL, a perfect price dis-
criminating monopolist is socially ineﬃcient, i.e. θppd < 1.
As the proof is straightforward, we only provide the intuition and a graphical illustra-
tion: with negative network eﬀects increasing demand not only reduces the price for the
marginal consumer, it also reduces the willingness to pay of all other consumers. Consider
ﬁgure 1. Instead of serving θppd suppose that the monopolist covers the entire market.
The additional rent he gains is given by area A. But, as the higher share of vaccinated
individuals reduces the willingness to pay, all individual prices are reduced. He loses rent
that amounts to area B. With full immunization the monopolist is clearly worse oﬀ.
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Figure 1: The case of perfect price discrimination with vaccination externality.
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The results of this section may simply be summarized by θ∗ < θppd ≤ 1. Both inequal-
ities require some further discussion. First, allowing the monopolist to perfectly price
discriminate improves access to vaccines and is thus socially desirable. In an interna-
tional context price discrimination is the rule rather than the exception. However, when
providing vaccines to developing countries at lower rates than to developed countries the
monopolist risks undermining prices in developed countries, e.g. by re-imports. This may
force the monopolist back to the uniform monopoly price. But developed countries have
an incentive to prohibit re-imports since higher monopoly proﬁts in the case of perfect
price discrimination facilitate stronger R&D incentives in a dynamic framework (see Kre-
mer (2002, pp. 76-77)). Of course, the same argument holds for arbitrage prevention
if price discrimination is employed at the national level. Second, although perfect price
discrimination yields higher welfare than standard monopoly, public health intervention
may still be necessary to correct for the externality.
5 Public policy
Obviously, within our setting of zero marginal cost, the socially optimal policy would be
to have the monopolist cover the whole market. We now discuss the consequences of two
standard public health interventions, namely price subsidies and mandatory vaccination
programs. To evaluate their beneﬁts, we analyze their potential to increase the degree of
immunization in society.
5.1 Price subsidies
Consider a policy of paying the monopolist a per unit subsidy of size s > 0. This is usually
a standard tool for alleviating the ineﬃciency caused by monopoly and a Pigouvian cure
for the vaccination externality. Unfortunately subsidies do not work very well in the
market for vaccines since the positive eﬀect of the subsidy is opposed by the prevalence
eﬀect: the increased demand due to the subsidy reduces the prevalence of the disease
and thereby the willingness to pay for vaccination. Things get worse when the subsidy
is to be ﬁnanced by taxation. Consider, for example, a head tax of size T . The income
12
distribution in this case shifts to [aL − T, aH − T ] creating a negative income eﬀect. The
government budget constraint is given by T = θs. Thus the monopolist now faces a
willingness to pay of
(11) p(θ; s) = zθ(1− θ) + za (aH − θs− θ∆) .
He actually receives p(θ; s) + s. If there is a positive subsidy, the monopolist chooses the
price such that
(12) θs =
zθ + zaaH + s
2(zθ + zas+ za∆)
.
Proposition 2 There exists a critical income eﬀect zcrita ∈ (0, 1) such that θs < (=, >)
θ∗ if za > (=, <) zcrita .
Proof. In principle θs = θ∗ could be solved for za. Since the actual size of zcrita is
of minor interest, we study two benchmark cases and apply a continuity argument.11 To
decide on the eﬀectiveness of the subsidy we have to compare θs with the laissez-faire
share θ∗ of equation (6):
(13) θs − θ∗ = s
2
zθ (1− za) + za∆− z2aaH
(zθ + zas+ za∆) (zθ + za∆)
.
Since the denominator of the right hand side of equation (13) is always positive, the sign
of θs−θ∗ is determined by the numerator: if za = 0 the numerator turns out to be zθ > 0.
The problem of discrimination is reduced by Pigouvian subsidies, since there is no income
eﬀect to oﬀset the positive eﬀect of the subsidy. This coincides with the result when a
public budget constraint is not considered. More interesting, if za = 1, then θ
s < θ∗.
Discrimination is further increased by subsidizing vaccines. This is due to the income
eﬀect caused by ﬁnancing the subsidy. By continuity, there exists some value zcrita ∈ (0, 1)
such that the subsidies have no eﬀect. In this case, the positive price eﬀect of the subsidy
on demand is exactly oﬀset by the two negative eﬀects, the prevalence eﬀect and the
ﬁnancing eﬀect. If the income eﬀect is suﬃciently large, i.e. za > z
crit
a , a subsidy makes
things even worse.
11zcrita =
1
2aH
(
∆− zθ +
√
z2θ + 2zθ (aH + aL) + ∆2
)
.
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This is in contrast with the classical regulatory arguments, where Pigouvian subsidies
are applied to correct for the ineﬃciencies due to the externality. This extreme eﬀect
was not previously known in the theory of vaccinations. Philipson (2000, p. 1777), for
example, states that subsidies are limited in their impact in dynamic settings, but that
they may have an eﬀect in the short-run or out of steady state. In our static setting, we
have shown—strengthening this result—that subsidies may have no eﬀect or may even
have a negative eﬀect. In a related paper, Philipson and Mechoulan (2003) point to
another pitfall of Pigouvian subsidies, namely, the distortion of R&D incentives.
5.2 Mandatory vaccination
Another public policy usually suggested is mandatory vaccination. If mandatory vaccina-
tion programs do not cover the whole population, the individuals vaccinated reduce the
infection probability of the susceptible. The willingness to pay is reduced, i.e. mandatory
demand crowds out voluntary demand. This is a standard argument for why it is diﬃcult
to eradicate a disease by mandatory vaccination if not the entire population is included
in the program (see e.g. Philipson (2000, p. 1781)). This argument also applies to the
model presented here if the social planner has no information about individual income
levels. But consider that income is observable, then a program is much more eﬀective
than usual. Since the individuals diﬀer in income the public program may only cover the
poor and the monopolist the rich.12
Let m ∈ [0, 1] be the share of mandatory vaccinated individuals. Consider that these
are the 100 times m percent poorest in the society. The willingness to pay (of the rich) is
now given by
(14) p(θ;m) = zθ(1− θ −m) + za (aH − θ∆) .
12We assume that the social planner can observe income, while the monopolist cannot, or does not, use
this information. As mentioned above, perfect price discrimination yields the same results qualitatively.
Since vaccination discrimination is lower, the optimal program with perfect price discrimination will be
smaller in size, but may still be necessary.
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The optimum is obtained by diﬀerentiation with respect to θ and is attained if
(15) θm =
(1−m) zθ + zaaH
2(zθ + za∆)
.
The overall share of vaccinated individuals is given by min{1,m + θm}. If m + θm < 1,
then the eﬀect of extending the mandatory vaccination program on the share of vaccinated
individuals is clearly positive: d (m+ θm) /dm > 0.
Proposition 3 With mandatory vaccination programs full immunization is achieved at
participation rates strictly smaller than 1.
Proof. Solving m+ θm = 1 for m yields
(16) m =
zθ + za∆− zaaL
zθ + 2za∆
.
The equivalence m < 1⇔ zaaH > 0 proves the assertion.
Mandatory vaccination is more eﬀective than in other models, e.g. Geoﬀard and
Philipson (1997), since the negative eﬀect of the externality is reduced by the still high
income eﬀect. As long as the income eﬀect is positive, a residual demand θm > 0 served
by the monopolist remains. Note that the government’s information about individual
income heterogeneity enables it to counter the strategic pricing behavior of the monopolist
originating precisely from such diﬀerences among individuals. The proposition provides
an eﬃciency based argument for distribution-oriented public health vaccination programs
like those typically supported by the WHO or the Worldbank.
In line with our comparative static results on income inequality, the share of the
population to be included in the program is higher, the higher income inequality. If
a society has a high amount of inequality, it is accompanied by a serious amount of
vaccination discrimination. Thus, the mandatory vaccination program must be relatively
large for full immunization. Of course, if income inequality is relatively low, there is
no need for a public vaccination program, since the monopolist already serves the entire
market.
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6 Conclusion
We presented a simple static model to study the eﬀects of monopoly power on the supply
side in the market for vaccines. We highlighted the importance of income inequality
when analyzing the monopolist’s incentive to exploit the external eﬀect of vaccinations to
maximize proﬁts.
In the monopoly solution the poor are discriminated against, i.e., remain susceptible,
in order to increase the willingness to pay of the rich. Interpreting individuals as countries,
the developing countries are strategically left without immunization. Discrimination was
found to be more severe if the prevalence elasticity of demand is high, i.e., when the
income eﬀect is low or the impact of the external eﬀect is high. Societies with low average
wealth or high income inequality are left with a high share of susceptible individuals.
With perfect price discrimination the prevalence of the disease will be lower. But, in
contrast to the standard monopoly model without external eﬀects, the outcome may still
be ineﬃcient.
If the social planner is not informed about the individual income levels, he is left with
two policy alternatives—Pigouvian subsidies and mandatory vaccination. Unfortunately,
subsidies are of limited use since the positive price eﬀect is opposed by two negative ef-
fects, the prevalence eﬀect and the income eﬀect. In some cases subsidies make things
even worse, raising doubts about whether Pigouvian subsidies are appropriate at all. As
usual, mandatory vaccination programs fail to eradicate the disease if not the entire pop-
ulation is included in the program. Things change dramatically when the social planner
is informed about individual income. The public health interventions may then be condi-
tional on income. A mandatory program covering the poor only yields full vaccination at
participation rates that are strictly smaller than one. Thus, when income is observable,
mandatory vaccination programs strictly dominate Pigouvian subsidies. This provides
an eﬃciency-based argument for public health vaccination programs directed towards the
poor or, within an international context, towards poor countries, like the ones advocated
and carried out by the Worldbank or the WHO.
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Appendix
Here we provide a micro foundation for our reduced form approach. We argue that a
vaccination can be seen as an insurance against the disease. Using this, we will derive a
suﬃcient condition for the willingness to pay being increasing in income. Furthermore we
show that under this condition a unique equilibrium always exists.
Vaccination as insurance
Consider an individual with an original income of a > 0, which reﬂects individual produc-
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tivity or wage-earning abilities, and preferences which obey the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms. The individual is exposed to the threat of becoming infected with a transmittable
disease. The probability of infection is given by π ∈ (0, 1], which is taken to be exogenous
to the individual.13 The monetary loss from infection depends on income, β = β(a). It
is sensible to assume that β > 0 and β′ ∈ [0, 1], since illness will lead to absence from
work for a certain time. Hence, a high income individual will lose (weakly) more than a
low income individual. A vaccine is available that yields perfect protection against the
disease and has no side eﬀects. The price for being vaccinated is denoted p. Then, the
utility for a vaccinated individual with income a is given by
(17) u = u(a− p).
The individual decides to vaccinate, if, and only if, the utility u exceeds the expected
utility Eu of remaining without protection, where
(18) Eu = πu(a− β(a)) + (1− π)u(a).
The decision to vaccinate amounts to the choice between the certain outcome and the
original risky outcome. Thus, the willingness to pay for vaccinations p(π, a) equals the
sum of two components, the increase in expected income, πβ, and the risk premium.
Applying the approximation formula for the risk premium derived by Arrow and Pratt
(see Pratt (1964)), we have p(π, a) ≈ πβ − u′′(EX)
u′(EX)
V ar(X)
2
, where EX = a − πβ and
V ar(X) = π (1− π) β2. Then, for a given infection probability, the willingness to pay
globally increases in income if for all a > 0 the following condition holds:
(19)
u′′′
u′′
− u
′′
u′
> 2β′
u′/ (u′′ (1− π))− β
(1− πβ′) β2 .
The numerator of the right hand side is always negative while the denominator is
positive. In the case of constant absolute risk aversion, the left hand side is zero, implying
a strictly increasing willingness to pay for vaccinations if β′ > 0. If the utility function
13Of course, in equilibrium, this probability will depend on the number of susceptible individuals. This
issue is addressed below. Like above, π can be interpreted as the (symmetric) expectation about the
infection risk.
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exhibits constant relative risk aversion, β′ must be suﬃciently large for the willingness to
pay to be non-decreasing in income.
In the following we will assume that condition (19) holds. Furthermore we assume
sorting of individuals, ∂θ/∂a < 0, and, reﬂecting the vaccination externality, ∂π/∂θ < 0.
The following two paragraphs compare to the treatment in section 3 (see e.g. lemma 1).
Expectations
Consider that the price p is exogenous. Moreover assume that (π, a) solves u (a− p) −
Eu (π, a) = 0, where π = π (θ (a)). Then expectations will be such that πe = π, i.e. (π, a)
is an equilibrium of the second stage game.
Proof: We have u (a− p)− Eu (π, a) = 0, where π = π (θ (a)). Suppose that πe > π.
Then u (a− p)−Eu (πe, a) > 0. Given the price p, the former indiﬀerent individual with
income a now obtains a positive rent. Since the willingness to pay is increasing in income
there exists an income level â < a with u (â− p) − Eu (πe, â) = 0. It follows that θ̂ > θ
and with it π̂ < π. Thus expectations with πe > π can never be conﬁrmed. A similar
argument applies when πe < π proving πe = π.
Uniqueness
Consider that the price p is exogenous. Assume that u (a− p) = Eu (a, π (θ (a))). Then
a is unique.
Proof: Consider an income â > a. We know from above that u (â− p)−Eu (â, π (θ (a))) >
0. Since â > a ⇔ θ̂ < θ ⇔ π̂ > π ⇔ Eu (â, π (θ (â))) < Eu (â, π (θ (a))) we have
u (â− p)−Eu (â, π (θ (â))) > u (â− p)−Eu (â, π (θ (a))) > 0. Thus no income â > a can
be a solution of our problem. As the same applies to every â < a, a is unique.
Consequences
From our analysis above we know that those who demand vaccination are, as long as
condition (19) holds, the rich. Of course, it is also possible to construct the theoretical
case where the willingness to pay decreases with income, e.g. if β′ = 0 and constant
relative risk aversion is assumed. However, this is contradicted by empirical evidence.
A direct implication of the increasing willingness to pay is uniqueness. This is diﬀerent
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from models with positive externalities where multiple equilibria may occur. Having these
results it is straightforward to generalize our reduced form to some function p (θ, a) with
∂p/∂θ < 0 and ∂p/∂a > 0 implying a downward sloping aggregate demand schedule.
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